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The sub-heading for the SALS seminar from whichthis article is drawn stated that “the circumstancesin which solicitors may, or may not, act for more
than one client in the same transaction are unclear”. This
was certainly the case until very recently, although the
position on this and related issues is, I believe, at last being
resolved. The manner in which confusion has turned to
clarity is itself interesting and, when understood, dispels
some of the misleading suggestions which are starting to
circulate in the context of the proposed changes to the Law
Society Rules.
I would like to refer back to early 2000 for reasons
which will become apparent. At that time, the most
difficult issues for solicitors were not only whether they
could act for more than one client in the same transaction,
but also whether they could ever act adverse to an existing
client on a matter which was unrelated to the work done
for that client. I am going to consider both issues, but first,
the question of acting adverse to an existing client.
PRINCE JEFRI CASE
Any solicitor seeking to get to the bottom of this basic
question would look to find the answer both at common
law and, separately, under the Law Society Rules. It is little
short of extraordinary that, at common law, the only
guidance in 2000 came in the form of dicta of Lord Justice
Millett in the Prince Jefri case (Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG
[1999] 2 AC 222) just over a year earlier, in November
1998. Lord Millett said (at p 234):
“a fiduciary cannot act at the same time both for and against
the same client, and his firm is no better position. A man
cannot without the consent of both clients act for one client
while his partner is acting for another in the opposite
interest”.
Some thought this was pretty clear; a law firm can never
act adverse to the interests of an existing client without its
consent.
Against this background, the solicitor in 2000 would
look to the Law Society Guide to Professional Conduct.
Chapter 15.01 provides:
“a solicitor or firm of solicitors should not accept instructions
to act for two or more clients where there is a conflict or a
significant risk of a conflict between interests of those clients”.
There is nothing here to suggest that the rule is intended
to apply only to instructions on the same matter, or related
matters. Even if it did, the position at common law – as
Lord Millett would seem to be stating it – would render
any such relaxation in the Law Society approach
ineffective. Professional rules can never be less strict than
those at common law.
It follows that in early 2000, there was a widespread
view that an English solicitor could never act adverse to an
existing client without its consent. This was not an absurd
conclusion; it was, and is now, the effect of US conflict
Rules. However, it was a position which was increasingly
open to question for two particular reasons:
1. Commercial clients were increasingly moving away
from having one firm of solicitors. Instead, they were
picking one firm for one type of work, another firm for
another. While it might be understandable that a firm
would not act against a client which would naturally
refer to it all its legal work, the perception is different
where that firm only obtains a small proportion of that
client’s instructions.
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2. The second reason reflected the overseas ambitions of
English lawyers. Over the last 40 years, English firms
have increasingly operated in foreign jurisdictions and,
with the advent of cross border deals, they have come
to practise alongside lawyers admitted in foreign
jurisdictions, and in particular in European countries.
In continental Europe, it is universally the practice that
a firm can act adverse to an existing client on matters
unrelated to the work done for that client.
WORKING PARTY ON CONFLICT REFORM
Against this background, the Law Society embarked on a
review of its rules. This was not just the conflict rules, but
its entire rulebook. As part of this process, the Law Society
asked the City of London Law Society to set up a working
party to come up with recommendations for conflict
reform which would be workable in the context of City
work. In February 2000, I was asked to chair that working
party.
The working party was unanimous in believing that
English lawyers should be able to act adverse to the interests
of a client on matters unrelated to work done for that
client. It reviewed the position at common law and felt that
the dicta of Lord Millett was not 100 per cent clear and, in
being only dicta, should not be taken as determinative. As
the eventual report said: “we are not aware of any other
similar finding or dicta at law… if this is the law we would
urge strongly that it be changed… if it is not changed, one
of the central recommendations of this report would be
impossible, and solicitors in England and Wales would
remain disadvantaged within the European Union” (CCLS
Report, July 2000, para 4.2).
The working party was reinforced in this
recommendation by the terms of the CCBE code, which
governs cross border conduct between lawyers in the
European Union. That code provides:
“a lawyer may not advise, represent or act on behalf of two or
more clients in the same matter if there is a conflict, or a
important risk of a conflict, between the interests of those
clients” (CCBE Code, October 1998, clause 3.2.1,
(emphasis added)).
Restricting the limitation to the same matter therefore
reflected the general approach in Continental Europe. On
cross border activities, English lawyers were required to
comply with the CCBE rule as a matter of law under
Practice Rule 16. More significantly, the code also provides
that this provision (along with others) should be “taken
into account in all revisions of national rules of deontology
or professional practice with a view to their progressive
harmonisation” (cl 1.3.2).
The report of my Working Party was published in July
2000. We proposed a conflict rule which defined conflict
as the situation where: “a solicitor owes separate duties to
act at the best interests of two or more different clients in
relation to the same or related matters, and those duties
conflict, or there is a significant risk that those duties will
conflict”.
We recognised that there was a real danger that we
would be told that this proposal would not be accepted
because it was less strict than the common law as set out by
Lord Millett. Our concerns were highlighted by the
publication – within days of the appearance of our report
– of the first edition of Hollander and Salzedo on Conflicts
of Interest and Chinese Walls.
In that book, the authors asked themselves whether the
dicta of Lord Millett should be interpreted to apply only to
conflicting instructions on the same matter. They answered
by saying that, since the foundation of the rule lies in the
duty of undivided loyalty which a solicitor has to a client,
the correct position at common law is not simply that a
solicitor cannot act adverse to a client where he is acting on
the same matter for that client, but that he cannot act
adverse to an existing client on any matter. They concluded
that the way Lord Millett expressed himself in the Prince
Jefri case was “wholly inconsistent” with the rule “being
limited to ‘same matter’ conflicts” (Hollander & Salzedo;
Conflicts of Interest and Chinese Walls, 1st ed, para 3–22,
p 27).
It was not a great start for our proposals.
The recommendations of the working party were
subsequently put out for consultation by the Law Society,
on two occasions. That was all that happened for some
three years. The aim of the Law Society was to introduce
an entire new rulebook in one go, including new conflict
rules. The change to the conflict rules was therefore
slowed down to accommodate the other changes. The
delay on conflict reform inevitably led to criticism of the
Law Society which, as a result, eventually decided in late
2003 to separate and “fast track” the conflict reform after
all. The working party’s proposals were to be dusted off
and, subject to fine tuning, approved by the Law Society’s
Standards Board before being recommended to the full
Council.
The Standards Board itself set up a committee to carry
out the fine tuning, and I was asked to join this in January
2004. That led to a number of developments to the original
proposals of the working party, before approval by the
Standards Board in May 2004. One recommendation of
the wording of the working party which remained
essentially untouched was the definition of conflict and the
limitation of its application to the “same or related
matters”.
Surprisingly, the disparity between the apparent position
at common law (endorsed by the Hollander book) and
what was being proposed was not materially challenged.
The new rules were to be formal rules and therefore –
unlike the existing Guide to Professional Conduct – have the
force of subordinate legislation. Adoption of the new rules 3





therefore carried with it the prospect of legislation
influencing the interpretation of Lord Millett’s dicta and
therefore the position at common law.
MARKS & SPENCER V FRESHFIELDS
The conflict proposals were set to be approved by the
Law Society Council on July 14, 2004. On June 2,
however, Marks & Spencer applied for an injunction to
restrain Freshfields from acting for Phillip Green in a
hostile bid. The application was unusual in raising not just
the issue of confidential information, but also of conflict.
Of direct relevance on that issue of conflict was whether
the fact that Freshfields acted for Marks & Spencer on
certain matters prevented them from acting on the hostile
bid.
Mr Justice Collins was, of course, referred to the dicta
of Lord Millett, and he was also referred to the Hollander
book. He agreed that the common law rule preventing a
solicitor from acting against an existing client did more
than merely stop a solicitor acting against a client on the
very matter where he was acting for the client. But,
critically, Mr Justice Collins said there had to be “some
reasonable relationship between the two matters” for the conflict
to exist (Marks & Spencer v Freshfields, June 2, 2004.
Approved draft note of judgment).
This was a vital qualification to the potential breadth of
the dicta of Lord Millett and to the interpretation endorsed
by Hollander & Salzedo. Mr Justice Collins’s determination
that there must be “some reasonable relationship” between
the two matters was satisfyingly close to the proposed
definition in the new conflict rule which limited “conflict”
to separate duties “in relation to the same or related
matters.1”
On June 3 2004, Freshfields sought leave to appeal Mr
Justice Collins’s judgment. The Court of Appeal refused
leave on the grounds that it had no realistic chance of
success. In making that decision, Lord Justice Pill felt that
there had to be “a degree of relationship” between the two
transactions for a conflict to arise. The court therefore
reiterated the finding of Mr Justice Collins, and the
approach in the proposed new Law Society definition.
The conclusion of the Marks & Spencer v Freshfields case
finally removed the threat that the single most important
clarification which it had been hoped would be achieved
through the proposed new Law Society Rules would
founder because it was inconsistent with the common law.
On July 15 2004, the Law Society Council approved the
new rules. The DCA permitting, they will come into force
in mid 2005.
I have dwelled on this element of conflict reform in
some detail. I make no apology for that, because I do feel
that it lay at the heart of the future approach to conflicts in
this country and would, in effect, determine whether we
lined up with the approach prevalent through continental
Europe, or with the US approach. In my view, there is a
good deal in the US approach which this country would do
well to avoid.
With the last minute benefit of the judgments in Marks &
Spencer v Freshfields, it is easy to forget the struggle to achieve
this important clarification in the law, which was sparked
by the working party report. The dicta of Lord Millett was
a significant impediment, made more difficult by the
endorsement of a restrictive interpretation in the first
edition of Hollander and Salzedo.
In late 2004, the second edition of Hollander and
Salzedo appeared, and it does of course report on the Marks
& Spencer v Freshfields case. It was interesting to see how the
authors had come to see things differently. To quote from
their new book:
“it was always hard to imagine that Lord Millett meant what
he said literally, and it was always unlikely that he intended
to say that the double employment matter prevented a
professional acting on opposite sides in unrelated matters.
There had surely to be as a matter of common sense some
limitation on the principle… it was always probable that
Lord Millett had in mind the case where there was some
relationship between the two matters such as to bring the
principle of conflict into play (Hollander & Salzedo, 2nd
ed, para 2–58, p 31).”
This represents a significant change of opinion.
Moreover, it could be said that the authors now go
overboard in characterising as unrealistic the approach they
adopted in 2000; it is worth bearing in mind that that same
approach underpins conflict law throughout the United
States.
So, it is now fair to say that the circumstances in which
solicitors may act adverse to the interests of an existing
client are becoming a lot clearer.
I would like to move on to consider the circumstances
in which a solicitor can act for more than one client in the
same transaction. In particular, I will look at the relevant
provisions in the new Law Society Rules in greater detail,
and give some views on what these mean for solicitors and
their clients in practical terms.
MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE NEW
RULES
Before I do that, there are just two misconceptions
about the new rules which I would like to correct.
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1 In the second edition of Hollander and Salzedo’s book published in September 2004, the authors state that Freshfields argued before Mr Justice Collins that the
working party which I chaired contended that Lord Millett’s comments should be read as limited to where the conflict related to the same matter. The application before
Mr Justice Collins was in chambers, and quite what was argued is uncertain. However, it is incorrect that the working party ever suggested that Lord Millett’s comments
should be so limited; it always took the view that conflict arose where there existed separate duties not only in the context of the same matter, but also related matters.
See Conflict of Interests and Chinese Walls, second edition, para 2–5.8 on p 31.
Unfortunately, both of these misconceptions are recorded
in the second edition of Hollander and Salzedo. Do not get
me wrong; this is for the most part a very good and
valuable book. The reason why I keep on making reference
to it is largely because it is the only book to comment on
the new rules.
The first misconception is that the review of the Law
Society Rules was “intended to give flexibility to large
firms” (Hollander and Salzedo, 2nd ed, para 11–235, p
204: I understand that the misconception sprang from a
speech given at the Law Society Council meeting which
approved the new rules and, if that is the case, that speech
similarly misrepresented the background to the review).
As everyone recognised, the former Law Society Rules
were in desperate need of updating. But the real trigger was
the fact that the Law Society decided that the advent of the
new millennium was a good time to embark on a review of
its entire rulebook. Prior to this, City firms were not
complaining about the status quo on conflicts; the Law
Society Rules had very little application because they were
so unclear, but there was a reasonably good unwritten
acceptance within the City as to what was, or was not a
conflict. It was not an environment where there were
regular complaints by clients or anyone else.
When the Law Society decided on the review, it asked
the City of London Law Society to make some proposals
because the Law Society was keen to ensure that any
proposed amendments would make sense in the context of
City work. Contrary to the suggestion recorded by
Hollander and Salzedo, my working party sought to
propose a balanced and responsible new code. We did not
seek to put forward a regime which would enable City
firms to do as they wished. I think everyone recognised
that any new set of rules would, in practice, involve a
tightening in comparison with the de facto regime. Having
got our proposals, the Law Society itself (primarily through
its Standards Board) had input on the wording, and made
some of the provisions more restrictive. I believe the result
is a regime which is workable, and a huge improvement on
what we have had, but it certainly does not purport simply
to liberate City firms, and nor was it ever intended to do
so.
The second misconception is that the Law Society would
have done better simply to have left the whole issue of
conflicts and confidentiality to the common law. This
suggestion misses the point in two respects. First, the
common law on conflict (as opposed to protection of
confidential information) was too unclear – right up until
June 2004 – for any regulatory body responsibly to rely
upon it as sole indication of its professional rules. Secondly
the Law Society did, in some respects, deliberately want
rules which were more strict than the common law. Let me
give two examples:
1. The Law Society wanted to make it clear that a
solicitor’s duty to disclose to a client any information
the solicitor has which is relevant to a retainer relates to
information from any source, and not just information
obtained from acting on that retainer.
2. In a Prince Jefri situation, the Law Society believed that
the client / former client to which the firm owed a duty
of confidentiality should always consent. The law firm
should not be able to erect walls, even to the Prince Jefri
standard, without the client / former client knowing,
and therefore having the chance to challenge what the
firm is doing before – perhaps – it is too late to
preserve confidentiality.
Examples such as these demonstrate, of course, that the
purpose of the new rules was not simply “intended to give
flexibility to large firms” (Hollander and Salzedo, 2nd ed,
para 11–235, p 204).
ACTING FOR MORE THAN ONE CLIENT IN
SAME OR RELATED TRANSACTION
I now come to what the new rules say in detail about a
solicitor acting for more than one client in the same
transaction, or related transaction.
First, a few words on the meaning of “same or related
matters”. This phrase is not defined, although some
guidance is provided. In particular, it is made clear that two
matters involving the same asset or liability would always be
treated as “related” (clause 2(d)). In addition, the
explanatory notes which provide guidance to the rule state
that there must be some “reasonable degree of relationship
for a conflict to arise”. Personally, I do not believe that it
would have been helpful to seek to define these terms with
any more precision. It is also worth bearing in mind that
many continental European countries have similar wording
and do not encounter any significant difficulty in applying
it.
There are then two exceptions to the basic rule that a
firm cannot act for more than one client on the same or
related matters. Both of these are very applicable to City
practice, and answer issues left unclear in previous Law
Society Rules. The first exception (which is also applicable
to High Street practice) provides that, subject to informed
written consent from all clients, the solicitor / firm may:
“act for two or more clients in relation to a matter in
situations of conflict or possible conflict if the different clients
have a substantially common interest in relation to that
matter or a particular aspect of it”.
The formal guidance explains that for there to be
“common interest” there must be a clear common purpose
and a strong consensus on how it is to be achieved. In
deciding whether it is appropriate to act, the solicitor must
consider whether the clients will be represented even-
handedly with equal weight being given to the instructions
from each. It is also for the solicitor to keep the differences
between the respective clients under review and to decide
if the point has been reached when it would be untenable 5
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to continue to represent all of them in a fair and open
manner or without any of them being prejudiced.
In terms of work typically done by City firms, this
exception is likely to be applied in situations like the
following:
(i) Where acting for a borrower and parent company
guarantor on a financing.
(ii) Where acting for arrangers on a note programme, and
also for the trustees.
(iii)Where acting for lenders on a syndicated loan and
advising on an inter-creditor agreement between them.
(iv) Where acting for joint venture partners in seeking to
achieve a specific contract.
Where a firm is acting for two clients who have a
common interest and material differences subsequently
arise, it is of course open to the firm to cease to act for one
or both clients on the particular issue which gives rise to
the difference. With that issue carved out – and if
necessary being dealt with by another firm – the rest of the
transaction can continue to be handled within the terms of
the exception.
The second exception, which is again subject to written
client consent, permits a firm to act for two or more
clients in relation to a matter in situations of conflict or
possible conflict if:
“the clients are competing for the same asset which, if
attained by one client, will make that asset unattainable to
the other client(s), and there is no other conflict, or
significant risk of conflict, between the interests of any of the
clients in relation to that matter”.
This exception is primarily aimed at two situations. The
first is the public auction of a business. The exception
permits a firm to act for competing bidders in the early
stages of the auction process, i.e. through to the point
where a preferred bidder is chosen, with detailed contract
terms then being negotiated by that preferred bidder. This
exception therefore respects what has become City
practice.
The exception is particularly applicable and relevant to
the flourishing private equity market which is based in the
City. In that relatively rarefied environment, a private
equity house would expect to be able to retain the advisors
of its choice, whether financial advisers, accountants,
lawyers or other consultants. To be able to select their
preferred advisers, they are generally happy to accept that
the same banks/firms can act for competing interests
behind suitable information barriers. It is worth noting
that it is not unusual for law firms to act for competing
interests in a similar way in a number of continental
European jurisdictions (although the Swedish bar last year
refused to sanction this practice).
The other type of work which the second exception
seeks to cover relates to insolvencies and refinancings. The
intention is to ensure that a firm can act for more than one
client in such situations, even where they may be
competing for limited assets. In theory, this could permit a
firm to embark on litigation adverse to another client, but
it may well be that a firm would agree with the relevant
clients that its roles would fall short of such action.
Although neither the exception nor the associated
guidance makes the position entirely clear, I would submit
that the exception also permits a firm to advise competing
clients prospectively on how assets would be split in the
event of an insolvency / restructuring. This would therefore
justify a firm acting for creditors on the preparation of an
inter-creditor agreement, in those situations where the
work did not already fall within the “common interest”
exception.
There are various further provisions which apply when a
firm seeks to rely on either of the exceptions. In particular,
there is a “catch-all” provision whereby the firm must only
act where it is objectively reasonable in all the
circumstances to do so. There are also provisions dealing
with the information which must be given to all clients so
that they can be properly informed before giving their
necessary consent.
CONCLUSION
Five years ago, a law firm did not know when or whether
it could ever act adverse to an existing client, or if it could
act for more than one client on a transaction. Once the
new Law Society Rules are properly in place, I believe the
situation will be acceptably clear under both the common
law and the professional rules. The Law Society Rules will
have the status of subordinate legislation and the courts will
therefore be able to enforce them in a way which they have
never sought to do so in the past. Quite how this will work
out, we will have to wait to see. However, on these issues
we now have respectable regimes and the change from
where we were – to where we are now arriving – is worth
remembering. As we have seen, memories are very short
and it is easy to forget the background, the context against
which the changes were made and, therefore, the
significance of them.
• The SALS seminar on solicitors’ conflicts of interest
from which this article is taken was held on November
25, 2004.
Chris Perrin
Executive Partner and General Counsel, Clifford Chance LLP; chairman,
City of London Law Society Working Party on Review of Conflict Rules
SOLICITORS’ PRACTICE (CONFLICT)
AMENDMENT RULE [2004]
Rule dated [the date of the Lord Chancellor’s approval]
made by the Council of the Law Society, under section 31
of the Solicitors Act 1974 and section 9 of the
Administration of Justice Act 1985 with the concurrence
of the Master of the Rolls under the latter section and the
approval of the Lord Chancellor under schedule 4 to the
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.
Amend rule 16 of the Solicitors’ Practice Rules 1990 by
making a new rule 16D as set out below.
(1) (Introduction)
(a) This rule sets out provisions for dealing with
conflicts of interest other than those conflicts in
relation to conveyancing, property selling or
mortgage related services which are dealt with in
rule 6.
(b) This rule applies to a regulated individual and a
regulated practice.
(c) Conflicts between the duty of confidence and
duty of disclosure owed by an individual or a
practice to two or more clients are dealt with in
rule 16E.
(2) (Duty not to act)
(a) You must not act if there is a conflict of interests
(except in the limited circumstances dealt with
in paragraph (3)).
(b) There is a conflict of interests if:
(i) you owe, or your practice owes, separate
duties to act in the best interests of two or
more clients in relation to the same or
related matters, and those duties conflict, or
there is a significant risk that those duties
may conflict; or
(ii) your duty to act in the best interests of any
client in relation to a matter conflicts, or
there is a significant risk that it may conflict,
with your own interests in relation to that or
a related matter.
(c) In criminal matters there will be a presumption
there is a conflict of interests in representing
more than one client in the same proceedings
unless the solicitor can show that special
circumstances apply to rebut this presumption
and that these circumstances have been noted on
the file.
(d) For the purpose of paragraph (2)(b) above, a
related matter will always include any other
matter which involves the same asset or liability.
(3) (Exceptions to duty not to act)
(a) You or your practice may act for two or more
clients in relation to a matter in situations of
conflict or possible conflict if:
(i) the different clients have a substantially
common interest in relation to that matter
or a particular aspect of it; and
(ii) all the clients have given in writing their
informed consent to you or your practice
acting.
(b) Your practice may act for two or more clients in
relation to a matter in situations of conflict or
possible conflict if:
(i) the clients are competing for the same asset
which, if attained by one client, will make
that asset unattainable to the other client(s);
(ii) there is no other conflict, or significant risk
of conflict, between the interests of any of
the clients in relation to that matter;
(iii) the clients have confirmed in writing that
they want your practice to act in the
knowledge that your practice acts or may act
for one or more other clients who are
competing for the same asset; and
(iv) unless the clients specifically agree, no
individual solicitor acts for, or is responsible
for the supervision of, more than one of
those clients.
(c) When acting in accordance with paragraphs
(3)(a) or (b) above it must be reasonable in all
the circumstances for you or your practice to act
for all those clients.
(d) If you are relying on the exceptions in
paragraphs (3)(a) or (b) above, you must:
(i) draw all the relevant issues to the attention
of the clients before agreeing to act or,
where already acting, when the conflict
arises or as soon as is reasonably practicable,
and in such a way that the clients concerned
can understand the issues and the risks
involved; and
(ii) have a reasonable belief that the clients
understand the relevant issues; and
(iii) be reasonably satisfied that those clients are
of full capacity.
(4) (Conflict when already acting)
If you act, or your practice acts for more than one client in
a matter and, during the course of the conduct of that
matter, a conflict arises between the interests of two or
more of those clients, you, or your practice, may only 7





continue to act for one of the clients (or a group of clients
between whom there is no conflict) provided that the duty
of confidentiality to the other client(s) is not put at risk.
(5) (Accepting gifts from clients)
Where a client proposes to make a lifetime gift or a gift on
death to, or for the benefit of,
(a) you;
(b) any proprietor or employee of the practice; or
(c) a family member of any of the above
and the gift is of a significant amount, in itself or having
regard to the size of the client’s estate and the reasonable
expectations of the prospective beneficiaries (unless the
client is a member of the beneficiary’s family), you must
advise the client to take independent advice about the gift.
If the client refuses, you must stop acting for the client in
relation to the gift.
(6) (Public office or appointment leading to
conflict)
You must decline to act where you, or another proprietor
or employee in your practice, or a member of your family
holds some public office or appointment as a result of
which:
(a) a conflict of interests, or a significant risk of a
conflict, arises, or
(b) the public might reasonably conclude that you,
or your firm, had been able to make use of the
office or appointment for the advantage of the
client, or
(c) your ability to advise the client properly and
impartially is inhibited.
(7) (Waivers)
Notwithstanding Rule 17 of these rules, the Council of the
Law Society shall not have power to waive any of the




Rule dated [the date of the Lord Chancellor’s approval]
made by the Council of the Law Society, under section 31
of the Solicitors Act 1974 and section 9 of the
Administration of Justice Act 1985 with the concurrence
of the Master of the Rolls under the latter section and the
approval of the Lord Chancellor under schedule 4 to the
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.
Amend rule 16 of the Solicitors’ Practice Rules 1990 by
making a new rule 16E as set out below.
(1) (Introduction)
(a) This rule sets out provisions for dealing with the
protection of clients’ or former clients’
confidential information and the duty of
disclosure owed to clients.
(b) This rule applies to a regulated individual and a
regulated practice.
(2) (Duty of confidentiality)
You and your practice must keep the affairs of clients and
former clients confidential except where disclosure is
required or permitted by law or by your client or former
client.
(3) (Duty of disclosure)
You must disclose to a client all information of which you
are aware which is material to that client’s matter
regardless of the source of the information unless:
(i) there is a duty of confidentiality as referred to in
paragraph (2) above, which always over-rides the
duty to disclose; or
(ii) the following circumstances exist, as a
consequence of which the duty does not apply:
(a) such disclosure is prohibited by law;
(b) it is agreed expressly that no duty to disclose
arises or a different standard of disclosure
applies; or
(c) you reasonably believe that serious physical
or mental injury will be caused to any
person if the information is disclosed to a
client.
(4) (Duty not to put confidentiality at risk by
acting)
If you hold, or if your practice holds, confidential
information in relation to a client or former client, you
must not risk breaching confidentiality by acting, or
continuing to act, for another client on a matter where
(i) that information might reasonably be expected
to be material; and
(ii) that client has an interest adverse to the first-
mentioned client or former client
except where proper arrangements can be made to protect
that information in accordance with paragraph 5 below.
(5) (Exception to duty not to put confidentiality at
risk by acting – where clients consent)
(a) You may act, or continue to act, in the
circumstances otherwise prohibited by
paragraph (4) above with the informed consent
of both clients but only if;8
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(i) the client for whom you act or are proposing
to act knows that your practice, or a
member of your practice, holds, or might
hold, material information (in circumstances
described in paragraph (4) above) in relation
to their matter which you cannot disclose; and
(ii) you have a reasonable belief that both clients
understand the relevant issues after these
have been brought to their attention; and
(iii) both clients have agreed to the conditions
under which you will be acting or continuing
to act; and
(iv) it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do
so.
(b) “Both clients” in the context of paragraph (5)
means:
(i) an existing or former client for whom your
practice, or a member of your practice,
holds confidential information; and
(ii) an existing or new client for whom you act
or are proposing to act and to whom
information held on behalf of the other
client is material (in circumstances
described in paragraph (4) above).
(c) If you, or you and your practice, have been
acting for two or more clients in reliance on rule
16D(3) (the conflict rule) and can no longer
fulfil its requirements you may continue to act
for one client with the consent of the other
client provided you comply with paragraph (5).
(6) (Exception to duty not to put confidentiality at
risk by acting – where no clients consent)
You may continue to act for a client on an existing matter,
or on a matter related to an existing matter, in the
circumstances otherwise prohibited by paragraph (4)
above without the consent of the client or former client for
whom your practice, or a member of your practice, holds,
or might hold, confidential information which is material
to your client (in circumstances described in paragraph (4)
above) but only if:
(a) it is not possible to obtain informed consent
under paragraph (5) above from the client or
former client for whom your practice, or a
member of your practice, holds, or might hold,
material confidential information; and
(b) your client has agreed to your acting in the
knowledge that your practice, or a member of
your practice, holds, or might hold, information
material to their matter which you cannot
disclose; and
(c) safeguards which comply with the standards
required by law at the time they are
implemented are put in place; and
(d) it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.
(7) (Waivers)
Notwithstanding Rule 17 of these rules, the Council of the
Law Society shall not have power to waive any of the
provisions of this rule.
